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was expressed in People v. Bonnerwith.3 22 According to the Bonnerwith court, more than a slight showing of judicial bias must be present
before a judge should be disqualified, stating that "[t]he proponent
should be required to show clear circumstances which would render
a particular judge unfit to hear the case."3 23
The United States Supreme Court has addressed itself to the
problem of disqualification in Tumey v. Ohio3 24 and Ward v. Village

of Monroeville.32- In both of these cases, a judge was disqualified because of a conflict of interest stemming from his dual role of judge
and mayor.3 20 While not condemning the mere union of judicial and
executive power, the Court in each case stated that due process of law
was denied in a situation where an official "occupies two practically
and seriously inconsistent positions, one partisan and the other judicial . ... -27 Although not dispositive of whether mere "appearances"
are enough to disqualify a judge,3 2 these decisions lend support to the
Kessler court's finding of a conflict of interest sufficient to warrant
disqualification of the Shelter Island justices of the peace.
INSURANCE LAW

Ins. Law § 167(3): Insurer absolved from defending Dole claim against
driver-spouse where passenger-spouse is plaintiff in main action.
With its decision in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co. v. Westlake, 29 the Court of Appeals has reversed a trend which
322
323
324
325

69 Mlisc. 2d 516, 30 N.Y.S.2d 248 (Justice Ct. Town of Rhinebeck 1972).

id. at 522, 330 N.Y.S.2d at 255.
273 U.S. 510 (1927).
409 US. 57 (1972).
326 The Court found that the accused individuals in both cases were denied due
process as required by the fourteenth amendment because of the pecuniary interest the
judges had in the outcome of the respective cases. In Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927),
part of the fine levied in the case went to the village, some of which was used to supplement the salary of the judge himself. Id. at 521-22. In Ward v. Village of Monroeville,
409 U.S. 57 (1972), the revenue from fines of the type involved provided a substantial
portion of the revenue of the village in which the judge served as mayor. Id. at 58.
327 409 U.S. at 60, quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 534 (1927).
328 Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) can be interpreted as supporting the position
that there need not be a finding of specific bias to disqualify a judge. The Court noted
that the evidence in Tumey dearly established the guilt of the accused, and that he
had received the minimum fine possible, but stated that irrespective of the evidence
against him, the defendant had been denied the right to an impartial judge. Id. at 535.
In like manner, Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972), can be interpreted
as supporting the same view. There, the Court found that an Ohio statute which disqualified judges who were interested, biased, or prejudiced in the outcome of litigation
before them, did not sufficiently protect the rights of the defendant, since it appeared
to require a showing of special prejudice. Id. at 61.
329 85 N.Y.2d 587, 524 N.E2d 137, 364 N.YS.2d 482 (1974). Westlake was an action
for declaratory judgment instituted by State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company. The insurer sought a declaration of "nonrespoasibility to defend or to pay any
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would have wrought great change in a previously well settled area of
insurance law. The Court rejected the contention that third-party
liability, arising under Dole v. Dow Chemical Co.,88 0 lies outside the
intraspousal exclusion from insurance coverage found in section 167(3)
of the Insurance Law.8 31 The Court unanimously held that, absent an
agreement to the contrary, an insurer is not obligated to defend or
indemnify a third-party defendant whose spouse instituted the main
claim.
The controversy surrounding the apparently broad and allencompassing language of the statute, is pointed up by the following
hypothetical. Husband (H) is driving car one and his wife (W) is a
passenger therein. Car one and car two, driven and owned by defendant (D), collide. As a result, W, having suffered personal injuries,
sues D. Thereafter, D institutes a Dole claim against H. The question
then arises as to whether H's insurance policy, containing no express
provision relating specifically to intraspousal liability, will cover the
impleader action so that H's insurer must defend him in any action
and indemnify him for any judgment arising therefrom.
As might be expected, a sharp clash of authority existed on this
point, with the case law equally divided. 832 The better view, as enunjudgment recovered" against the insured, a third-party defendant in an action begun by
his wife. Id. at 590, 324 N.E.2d at 138, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 484.
880 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972).
381 That section provides:
[N]o policy or contract shall be deemed to insure against any liability of an
insured because of death of or injuries to his or her spouse . .. unless express
provision relating specifically thereto is included in the policy.
N.Y. INs. LA-W § 167(3) (McKinney 1966).
882 Compare Logan v. Exchange Mut. Ins. Co., 44 App. Div. 2d 886, 355 N.YS.2d
855 (4th Dep't 1974) (mem.) (a fair interpretation of § 167(3) required an insurer to
defend an insured where the insured and his wife sued a defendant who then interposed
a counterclaim for indemnity against the husband); Stone v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 76
Misc. 2d 1021, 351 N.Y.S.2d 496 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1973) (§ 167(3) was not applicable to a Dole action against the husband of the plaintiff); United States Fidelity &
Guar. Co. v. Franklin, 74 Misc. 2d 506, 344 N.Y.S.2d 251 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County
1973), aff'd mem., 43 App. Div. 2d 844, 352 N.Y.S.2d 1009 (2d Dep't 1974) (§ 167(3) should
be narrowly construed and should not be interpreted to deny coverage to an insured
driver because he was the spouse of the injured passenger); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v.
DeLosh, 73 Misc. 2d 275, 341 N.Y.S.2d 465 (Sup. Ct. St. Lawrence County 1973) (possibility
of fraud in Dole actions is sufficiently remote so as to make unjust a holding that the
legislature intended to exclude coverage with regard to such claims in § 167(3)), with
United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Gould, 43 App. Div. 2d 462, 352 N.Y.S.2d 541 (4th Dep't
1974) (where plaintiff-wife, a passenger in a car owned by the corporation of which her
husband was president, recovered a judgment against the corporation, the corporation's
insurer was not obligated to defend and indemnify the driver-husband because of the
§ 167(3) exclusion); Perno v. Exchange Mut. Ins. Co., 73 Misc. 2d 346, 342 N.Y.S.2d 298
(Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1973) (construing the language of § 167(3) broadly, stating that
exclusion from coverage of the third-party spouse cannot be said to abrogate the intention of the legislature); Smith v. Employer's Fire Ins. Co., 72 Misc. 2d 524, 340 N.Y.&2d
12 (Sup. Ct. Tompkins County 1972) (construing § 167(8) broadly to encompass Dole
actions within the exclusion).
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ciated in the more persuasive opinions8 8 and espoused by several commentators, 34 was that Dole liability was not contemplated by section
167(3). In State Farm, however, the Court of Appeals has strictly
construed the language of the Insurance Law and refused to allow
Dole to alter what it deemed to be the plain intendment of the statute.
The decision in State Farm rested upon two main points. First,
the language of section 167(3) was said to be "all inclusive and .. .
applicable 'whenever indemnification is asked by a husband whose
liability, regardless of the form in which or person by whom asserted,
is basically and unquestionably because of injuries sustained by his
wife as a result of his negligence.' "325 Second, it was felt that to obligate the insurer to defend and indemnify the insured spouse when a
Dole apportionment is fixed for injuries caused to his wife would be
"to rewrite the contract of the parties."38 6 Since the insured is not
obligated to pay "the necessary premium for the added coverage,"3 '
an extension of coverage to Dole actions would, the Court urged,
expose the insurer "to a risk not contemplated by the parties and for
'38
which it is not compensated."
It is beyond contention that the legislative purpose behind section 167(3) is to protect insurance carriers from collusive actions
between spouses arising from automobile accidents.83 9 Whether this
purpose is served when section 167(3) is read to exclude intraspousal
coverage for liability arising from Dole actions has been the subject of
careful analysis in conflicting decisions.8 40 In the State Farm decision
in the Appellate Division,3 4 ' a majority of the Second Department
concluded that there was little likelihood of fraud since the plaintiff383 See, e.g., Stone v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 76 Misc. 2d 1021, 351 N.Y.S.d 496 (Sup.
Ct. Albany County 1973); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Franklin, 74 Misc. 2d
506, 344 N.Y.S.2d 251 (Sup. CL Westchester County 1973), aff'd mem., 43 App. Div. 2d

844, 352 N.Y.S.2d 1009 (2d Dep't 1974).
834 7B MACKINNEY'S CPLR 3019, commentary at 253-55 (1974); Birnbaum, Civil Practice, in 1973 Survey of New York Law, 25 SvA cusE L. REV. 321, 350-51 (1973); Lynch,
Insurance, in 1973 Survey of New York Law, 25 SYRACUsE L. Rnv. 239, 24042 (1973);
McLaughlin, New York Trial Practice, 168 N.Y.L.J. 109, Dec. 8, 1972, at 5, cols. 1-2; The

Quarterly Survey, Dole v. Dow Chemical Co.: Recent Developments, 47 ST. JoHN's L.
725, 762 (1973).

REv.

88 35 N.Y.2d at 592, 324 N.E.2d at 139, 864 N.Y.S.2d at 486 (citations omitted) (emphasis added), quoting Peka, Inc. v. Kaye, 208 Misc. 1003, 1005, 145 N.YS.2d 156, 159
(Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1955), rev'd on other grounds, 1 App. Div. 2d 879, 150 N.Y.S.2d
774 (Ist Dep't 1956) (mer.).

33835 N.Y.2d at 592, 324 N.E.2d at 189, 864 N.Y.S.2d at 486.
337 Id.
338

Id.

339 See New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Stecker, 3 N.Y.2d 1, 6-8, 143 N.E2.d 857, 359-60,

163 N.YS.2d 626, 630-31 (1957).
340 See note 332 supra.
84143 App. Div. 2d 314, 851 N.Y..2d 147 (2d Dep't 1974), rev'd, 35 N.Y.2d 587, 324

N.E.2d 137, 369 N.YS.2d 482 (1974).
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wife would have to be successful in her action against the defendant
before the latter would have any right over against the husband. The
court noted that "the situation created by the Dole rule in cases such
as this carries a built-in safeguard against any collusion between
spouses directed against the insurer of one of the spouses." 342
The circuity of action present in the Dole situation had been
assigned varying degrees of effect in negating collusion and fraud. In
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. DeLosh, 43 utilization of a Dole apportionment was seen as eliminating the incentive and possibility of fraud.
In Stone v. AgriculturalInsurance Co.,344 the court, though specifically

conceding that there may indeed be some possibility for fraud, implicitly minimized the importance of such possibility. 345 Even in a
decision that applied the section 167(3) exclusion, Perno v. Exchange
Mutual Insurance Co., 840 the diminished possibility for fraud and
collusion had been conceded. However, the court in Perno noted that

the situation which section 167(3) was intended to prevent may still
exist in at least one particular instance: where the injuries to the

passenger-spouse are substantial, collection of any part of a judgment
in excess of the defendant's insurance coverage will be aided if that
defendant can recover judgment for the excess from the driver-spouse

through a Dole action. If the exclusion is held not to apply, such excess
would be paid by the driver-spouse's insurer. Where the injured
spouse confronts a defendant with limited coverage, the driver-spouse,
to facilitate his wife's recovery, may be induced to concede to a

liability greater than his actual responsibility when named as a thirdparty defendant. Though the injured spouse has legitimately sustained
and proved her damages against a nonspouse defendant, the driverspouse's insurer is made to suffer by paying a larger portion of the
verdict than is just.
34243 App. Div. 2d at 317, 851 N.YS.2d at 150; accord, United States Fidelity aGuar. Co. v. Franklin, 74 Misc. 2d 506, 508-10, 344 N.Y.S.2d 251, 253-54 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1973), aff'd mem., 43 App. Div. 2d 844, 352 N.Y.S.2d 1009 (2d Dcp't 1974).
343 73 Misc. 2d 275, 341 N.Y.S.2d 465 (Sup. Ct. St. Lawrence County 1973).
344 76 Misc. 2d 1021, 351 N.Y.S.2d 496 (Sup. Ct: Albany County 1973).
345 The desire to protect against fraud was made to give way to stronger policy
considerations:
To give a strict literal interpretation to § 167 subd. 3 of the Insurance Law and
to determine that there is no coverage afforded in such a situation . . .is to
make a determination in direct contravention to the expressed intent of the
Legislature that motorists shall be financially able to respond to damage for
their negligent acts.
76 Misc. 2d at 1025, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 500.
84673 Misc. 2d 346, 342 N.Y.S.2d 298 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1973); accord, Smith
v. Employer's Fire Ins. Co., 72 Misc. 2d 524, 340 N.Y.S.2d 12 (Sup. Ct. Tompkins County
1972).
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Nevertheless, the likelihood of fraud and collusion is sufficiently
remote in the context of a Dole claim for indemnity against the plaintiff's spouse. Accordingly, the purpose of section 167(3) is served if the
exclusion is held inapplicable. The Court of Appeals, however, did
not consider this factor persuasive. Judge Stevens, writing for the
Court, remarked: "The absence of fraud or the possibility of fraud is
not sufficient to negate the plain intendment of the statutory exclusion
provision."' 4 7 In spelling out what it deemed to be that clear intendment, the Court implicitly rejected an argument, advanced in several
lower court cases, 348 that the language of section 167(3) does not in
fact relate to liability arising from an apportionment of damages.
In State Farm, the Court of Appeals has chosen to follow the consistently applied rule which flatly rejects any device used to circumvent the reach of section 167(3). The Supreme Court, Bronx County,
enunciated this broad prohibition in Peka, Inc. v. Kaye:349 "Courts

may not lend themselves to an indirect avoidance of, or a flank attack
upon, a law whose purpose is to protect against collusive actions between husbands and wives." 350 Likewise, in Smith v. Employer's Fire
Insurance Co.,35 1 the Supreme Court, Tompkins County, found the
language of the statute "clear and specific": "[Section 167(3)] absolves
an insurer from defending an action where the liability of its insured
is incurred because of death or injuries to the spouse."3 52 The Smith
court, in turn, relied upon Feinman v. Rice Sons, Inc.35 3 for a strict
construction of section 167(3). There, the wife of the insured brought
suit against her husband's employer based on the spouse's negligence
in operating his employer's automobile with the latter's permission.
In the third-party suit by the employer against the husband for indemnity, the Supreme Court, Bronx County, held that section 167(3)
absolved the insurer from any obligation under the insurance contract
to defend and indemnify the husband. 5 4
Feinman, however, can be readily distinguished from the factual
situation present in those decisions involving Dole apportionments.
In Feinman, the injured wife's claim against the employer-defendant
347 35 N.Y.2d at 592, 324 N.E.2d at 139, 364 N.YS.2d at 486.
34

8

See note 332 supra.

849 208 Mv[isc. 1003, 145 N.Y.S.2d 156 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1955), rev'd on other

grounds, I App. Div. 2d 879, 150 N.YS.2d 774 (1st Dep't 1956) (mem.).
350 208 Misc. at 1007, 145 N.Y.S.2d at 159.
351 72 Misc. 2d 524, 340 N.Y..2d 12 (Sup. Ct. Tompkins County 1972).
352 Id. at 525, 340 N.YS.2d at 13 (emphasis in original).
353 2 Misc. 2d 86, 133 N.Y..2d 639 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1954), aff'd mem., 285 App.
Div. 926, 139 N.YS.2d 884 (Ist Dep't 1955).
854 2 Misc. 2d at 83, 133 N.YS.2d at 641.
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was based entirely on her husband's negligence; liability of the employer-owner was purely vicarious, and his claim over against the
insured husband was grounded in common law indemnification. The
cases involving a Dole action present a different situation. Claims over
against the spouse-driver have been predicated on an apportionment
of liability between co-tortfeasors. Consequently, the plaintiff is not
asserting a claim of negligence directly or indirectly against a spouse,
but is predicating his claim solely on the negligence of the defendant.
It is the defendant's negligence, not the spouse's, which is the basis for
the plaintiff's recovery. 5 5 Based on this distinction, the Supreme Court,
Westchester County, in United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v.
Franklin,85 6 advanced the theory that the liability described in the
exclusion section is not in fact the liability arising in a Dole apportionment, since the latter does not arise because of injuries to the insured's
spouse. The court stated:
An analysis of the newly recognized right to proportional indemnity among joint tortfeasors, as described in Dole, indicates
that this is a right of a special kind; a right to recovery of an independent obligation owed to one joint tortfeasor by another....
The right, therefore, to crossclaim against the spouse-operator
•.. is not a right based upon the injuries suffered by his wife, but
rather a right based on the obligation of the spouse-operator to
the defendants. ....
.57

The Court of Appeals, in State Farm, found the meaning of "any
liability" to be clear. It drew no fine distinctions, nor contemplated
the results of its blanket rule. In so holding, the decision marks a
retreat from what the Supreme Court, Nassau County, noted was the
"modem" trend, viz., "to extend the class of persons insured under
standardized automobile insurance policies. This is largely to protect
the public, and to facilitate indemnity to innocent victims of vehicular
misuse."' 5 8 In almost all decisions supporting coverage in the Dole
action against the insured, the courts have noted that the injured
plaintiff might only recover a portion of his actual damages if the
spouse were required to pay over to the defendant a portion of the
355 See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Westlake, 43 App. Div. 2d 314, 318, 351
N.Y.S.2d 147, 151 (2d Dep't 1974), rev'd, 135 N.Y.2d 587, 324 N.EY,2d 137, 364 N.Y.S.2d 482
(1974); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. DeLosh, 73 Misc. 2d 275, 278-79, 341 N.Y.S.2d 465, 469
(Sup. Ct. St. Lawrence County 1973).
356 74 Misc. 2d 506, 344 N.Y.S.2d 251 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1973), aff'd mem.,
43 App. Div. 2d 844, 352 N.Y.S.2d 1009 (2d Dep't 1974).
357 74 Misc. 2d at 511, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 256.
358 Long Island Lighting Co. v. Hartford Accident Indem. Co., 76 Misc. 2d 832, 833,
350 N.Y.S.2d 967, 968 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1973).
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verdict attributable to his negligence. 59 Since the Court of Appeals
has seen fit to ignore this possibility and to follow a restrictive statutory interpretation, the burden now rests with the legislature to liberalize the law.
DOLE v. Dow CHEMICAL Co.
Federal Tort Claims Act

By virtue of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 6 0 the United States
has agreed to waive its sovereign immunity361 in certain instances3 6 2
involving suits based on personal injury or property loss caused by the
negligent or wrongful act of a federal government employee. Congress, however, conditioned consent to suit on the requirement that
the liability of the United States be determined in a federal district
court. 363 The legislative history of the Act indicates that the denial of
state court jurisdiction over such suits was designed to protect the
Government from overly generous verdicts on the part of state court
juries.6
Pursuant to this statutory design, the United States, as third-party
defendant in Gerardi v. Brady, 6 5 moved for an order dismissing the
complaint fied against it in the New York Supreme Court.3 66 The
parent action was brought by plaintiffs, injured as a result of a colli359 See, e.g., Stone v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 76 Misc. 2d 1021, 1023, 351 N.Y..2d 496,
499 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1973).
360 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671 et seq. (1970). For a detailed explanation of the purpose
of the Federal Tort Claims Act, see Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
861 For a discussion of the concept of sovereign immunity, see Pound, The Tort
Claims Act: Reason or History? 20 NACCA LJ. 404 (1964).
862 Immunity is waived by the United States where, in accordance with the law of
the state where the act or omission occurred, an individual would be liable. See 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1346(b), 2674 (1970).
363 See id. § 1346(b), which provides:
[iThe district courts ... shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims
against the United States, for money damages, accruing on and after January 1,
1945, for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the
negligent or vrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while
acting within the scope of his office or employment ....
See also United States v. Sherwood, 312 US. 584 (1941), wherein the Supreme Court stated:
The United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents to be
sued, . . . and the terms of its consent to be sued in any court define the court's
jurisdiction to entertain the suit.
Id. at 586 (citations omitted). The United States' consent is also conditioned on the timely
commencement of the suit as provided in 28 US.C. § 2401 (1970).
364See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 4, 12 (1945) (Minority Objections). In fact, actions against the United States under section 1346(b) must be tried in
the federal district courts without juries. See 28 US.C. § 2402 (1970).
865 78 Misc. 2d 11, 355 N.YS.2d 281 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1974) (mer.).
866 The motion was made pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(2) and (7) upon the ground that
the court had no jurisdiction of the subject matter of the third-party complaint against
the United States.

